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JANET L. DOLGIN

Hofstra University

Neither Father nor Doctor ‘‘Knows Best’’:
From Tradition to Choice in the Family
and on the Wards

This review article analyzes 3 developments
within the world of health care that involve
concomitant changes in the scope of family and
the form of family relationships. The first follows
from construction of the informed-consent
doctrine and its implementation, the second
stems from stunning innovations in reproductive
technology, and the third involves the increasing
significance of genetic information for medicine.
The article suggests that an analysis of changing
relationships within the world of health care
may offer insights about shifts in the meaning of
family. As social domains, the world of family
and the world of health care have undergone
similar transformations during the past half
century. Shifts in the foundational assumptions
in each domain—that of the family and that of
health care—inform shifts in the other domain.
Examining the actualization of these shifts can
assist scholars and practitioners in guiding
discourse and in resolving disputes among
family members and among those who populate
the world of health care, including clinicians,
patients, and patients’ family members.
Parallel transformations in key assumptions
about personhood and about relationships among
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people have reshaped relationships within families and within the world of health care in the
past 4 or 5 decades. More precisely, relationships within families and relationships between
clinicians and patients increasingly resemble
relationships in the marketplace. Fixed roles
and statuses have largely been replaced by
demands for choice as the terms of relationships are increasingly open to negotiation, and
paternalism is no longer widely valued in either
social domain. Unsurprisingly, these changes
have been accompanied by controversy. Moreover, the changes have resulted in significant
uncertainties about the shape of relationships and
the meaning of personhood, both within families
and between clinicians and patients. Confusion
has been especially discomforting in situations
that simultaneously challenge traditional family
relationships and traditional understandings of
the clinician–patient relationship.
This review examines three health-care developments that have reshaped the roles of
clinicians, patients, and family members to
illustrate the character of parallel—and often
synergistic—changes in the worlds of family and
health care. In each of these contexts, conflicts
between the goals of individualism (privileging
individual autonomy) and those of community
(privileging paternalism and group solidarity)
have energized new understandings of relationships that were once understood through the
lens of hierarchically organized communities.
These developments have affected relationships
among family members and relationships in the
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world of health care. Underlying shifts in both
social domains have encouraged more flexibility and choice, which may prove fruitful for
understanding new forms of family and for
providing new understandings of relationships
among clinicians, patients, and patients’ family
members. Construction of the informed-consent
doctrine, for instance, has dramatically reshaped
relationships between patients and physicians
(Schuck, 1994). Similarly, the increasing use
of reproductive technologies has further challenged concepts of family as society and the law
increasingly have relied on autonomous choice
and intention to define families (Garrison, 2000).
THE DOMAIN OF THE ‘‘TRADITIONAL FAMILY’’
The so-called traditional family in the United
States developed in the early years of the 19th
century, largely in response to the demands of
the Industrial Revolution (Grossberg, 1985).
During the 19th century and most of the
20th century, Americans viewed the family
through fixed, hierarchically structured roles
and attendant statuses, such as gender and age
(Demos, 1986). In contrast to society’s vision
of the traditional family, Americans imagined
the marketplace of the Industrial Revolution as
populated with putatively equal, autonomous
individuals who were expected to negotiate
the terms of their own relationships. American
society viewed the marketplace as structured
through reference to money, not love, and
those who populated it were not expected
to develop lasting, committed relationships.
Rather, relationships were expected to continue
as long as—and only as long as—the negotiated
bargains on which they were shaped continued
(Demos, 1986).
Mainstream American society seemed most
unhesitatingly to embrace the notion of a
traditional family during the middle decades
of the 20th century, just before the appearance
of new forms of family that more resembled
the autonomy of the marketplace. For example,
Schneider’s (1968) classic study of American
kinship described the mid-20th-century family
as a unit grounded in love, not money; loyalty,
not bargains; and community, not individualism.
In these traditional families, family members
were not viewed as autonomous individuals;
rather, the identity of each depended on the
hierarchical structure of the whole (Maine, 1917;
Schneider, 1968). Values such as individualism,
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clearly reflected in American economics and
politics almost from the nation’s beginning,
largely eluded many families until the late 1960s
(Grossberg, 1985). However, by the last several
decades of the 20th century, the ideological
distinctions that separated the world of home
from the world of work began to blur. Family
members (or at least adults within families)
increasingly began to define one another as
autonomous individuals, joined together as
long as (and only as long as) they chose to
remain connected. Some segments of the public
vehemently rejected this new vision of family,
but even among many of those who preferred
traditional visions of family, the notion of
choice (e.g., the choice to be a certain kind
of wife or husband) displaced the presumptive
inflexibility of traditional family relationships.
Moreover, various subcultures in the United
States entertained somewhat different visions of
family.
Concomitant shifts in family law in the
United States, began—hesitantly at first—in the
mid-1960s. Changes in the law reflected the
process through which adult family members
were redefined as autonomous individuals, each
vis-à-vis the others. For example, in Griswold v.
Connecticut (1965), the U.S. Supreme Court
invalidated a Connecticut birth control law.
Yet the reasoning behind the Court’s ruling
mostly relied on traditional understandings of
family. In particular, the Court stressed the right
of a married couple to make decisions about
contraception without state intrusion. The Court
described marriage in the most traditional terms:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the
degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony
in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty,
not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved
in our prior decisions. (Griswold v. Connecticut,
1965, p. 486)

Then, in 1972 the Court expanded the
protection offered in Griswold and, in doing that,
voiced a nontraditional understanding of family.
The ruling in the case Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972)
invalidated a Massachusetts law that prohibited
the distribution of birth control to unmarried
adults. In Eisenstadt, the Court jettisoned the
presumed distinction between relationships at
home and relationships at work and granted
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adults the right to make choices precluded by
traditional understandings of family. The Court
wrote:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in
question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the
marital couple is not an independent entity with a
mind and heart of its own, but an association of two
individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting
a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child. (Eisenstadt v. Baird, 1972, p. 453)

Thus, by 1972 the US Supreme Court assumed
a vision of family relationships—or at least of
relationships among adults within families—that
looked much more like relationships in the
marketplace and the public sphere more
generally than those in the traditional home.
In this regard, the portrait of spouses painted in
Eisenstadt contrasts strikingly with that assumed
7 years earlier in Griswold.
Other changes in family law in the 1970s
echoed this shift toward viewing family members as independent persons who choose to
relate to each other in various ways—or not
to relate—and thus, for instance, to separate or
divorce. During this period, courts also began
to recognize cohabitation agreements between
unmarried partners (e.g., Marvin v. Marvin,
1976; Morone v. Morone, 1980). Similarly, the
law granted potential spouses the right to enter
into prenuptial agreements. Such agreements
delineate the details of a possible future separation or divorce (Sherer v. Sherer, 1982). In short,
American law and the society of which it is part
have come increasingly to expect family members (and particularly adult family members) to
shape the parameters of their relationships and,
if desired, to shape the terms that end those
relationships.
DOES DOCTOR STILL KNOW BEST?
A process that began to transform the family
from a hierarchically structured community to
a collection of autonomous individuals who
choose their relationships and the terms of
those relationships found its analogue in the
world of health care during the same decades.
Both domains, long imagined as distinct from
the marketplace and from most public arenas,

largely abandoned their traditional presumptions
over the course of the second half of the 20th
century.
Throughout the 19th century and much of
the 20th century, medicine was identified as a
‘‘profession’’ that participated in, but stood at
the margins of, the world of commerce. Unlike
relationships in the commercial marketplace,
relationships between patients and health-care
professionals were expected to be paternalistic,
trusting, and loyal (Dworkin, 1988). Society
presumed that the world of health care was
structured hierarchically—that, in a nutshell,
‘‘doctor knew best. (Dworkin, 1988, p. x). By
the start of the 21st century, another model—one
resembling that which is operative in the
commercial marketplace—had largely displaced
the traditional model. In Dworkin’s (2003)
phrase, the conclusion ‘‘doctor knows best’’ was
replaced by the assertion ‘‘It’s my body.’’ The
development of the informed-consent doctrine
in the United States illustrates the scope of
the transformation of relationships in the world
of health care. Previously, patients did not
assume a right to participate in their healthcare decisions. Doctors made medical decisions,
and for the most part, patients accepted those
decisions gratefully. In 1914, for example,
New York’s highest court obliged surgeons to
obtain a patient’s consent before operating, but
there was no presumption that the patient was
entitled to information explaining or justifying
the physician’s decision (Schloendorff v. Society
of the New York Hospital, 1914). Patients had
a presumptive right to consent to or refuse to
consent to care, but Judge Cardozo, who wrote
the New York court’s opinion in Schloendorff ,
did not impose an obligation on physicians to
inform patients about the details of proposed care
before patients agreed to or refused that care.
Not much changed for almost 6 decades, until,
virtually at once, courts and legislatures began
to require a patient’s consent to or refusal of
care to be premised on information about the
care in question. Soon, the informed-consent
doctrine became the governing law in almost
every jurisdiction in the United States. This
doctrine assumes the autonomous individuality
of patients. Beginning in the 1970s, patients
were given the right not only to refuse treatments
suggested by their health-care providers but also
to be given adequate information about their
condition and possible modes of treatment so as
to make an informed decision about whether to
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consent to care (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001;
Canterbury v. Spence, 1972).
In parallel fashion, health-care practitioners,
especially physicians, dramatically altered their
approach to conversations with patients about
treatment options. Whether particular changes in
practice reflected or were reflected in changes in
the law (or both), the shift in law and practice by
the 1970s was undeniable. An article published
in Journal of the American Medical Association
in the early 1960s reported that about 90% of
physicians refrained from informing a patient
about a cancer diagnosis (Oken, 1961). An
article published in the same journal 18 years
later, reported that 98% of physicians surveyed
did inform a patient about a cancer diagnosis
(Novack et al., 1979). In that 18-year period, a
universe governed by paternalistic presumptions
had largely evaporated. The expectation that
doctors, not patients, should make healthcare decisions because doctors, not patients,
understand illnesses and how to treat them was
replaced with the expectation that patients were
partners in medical decision making.
By the 1980s, transformations in the social
world of medicine clearly paralleled those in
the family arena. In both contexts, a world
that prized individual autonomy had largely
replaced one that had prized hierarchically
structured relationships and that had assumed
long-term trust and loyalty. More particularly,
both relationships in the family arena and those
in the world of medicine came increasingly
to resemble relationships in the commercial
marketplace.
CHANGES IN HEALTH CARE AND FAMILY
RELATIONSHIPS
Many developments in the world of health
care in the past several decades have reflected
and, in turn, fostered new understandings of
relationships among family members. Three
such developments and their implications
for relationships among family members and
between patients and clinicians are reviewed
in this article: (a) construction and elaboration
of the informed-consent doctrine in clinical
settings and the related development of rules
about medical decision making for patients
lacking capacity; (b) the advent of reproductive
technology and responses to families created
through reliance on it; and (c) genetics and
genomics, which holds stunning implications
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for understandings of personhood and of
family.
Development and Elaboration of the
Informed-Consent Doctrine
The first of these developments involves the
construction of the informed-consent doctrine.
The Belmont Report (National Commission
for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1979), a
foundational bioethics document that provides
ethics guidelines for human-subject research,
identifies ‘‘respect for persons’’ as a core moral
value. The report specifies that implementation
of respect for persons as a value should entail
construction of an informed-consent process
for research subjects. That understanding has
been widely appropriated and applied to clinical
medicine as well.
Yet only a half century ago, neither individual patients (in relation to clinicians) nor
family members (in relation to one another) were
considered autonomous. Health-care choices
usually reflected physicians’ conclusions, sometimes in consultation with certain, but not all,
family members. Under Roman law, a family’s
paterfamilias voiced the family’s choice. That
person, typically the ‘‘father of the family’’ or
‘‘owner of the familial estate,’’ had absolute
control of family matters. The term continues to
be used to refer to the authority of the ‘‘father’’
(generally the oldest, male member of the household). Moreover, the choice of the paterfamilias
was often enough his choice rather than that of
the patient (Deftos, 1997; Tooley v. Provident
Life & Accident Insurance Co., 1963). Indeed,
well beyond the reach of health-care decisions,
courts generally avoided interfering with decisions of the paterfamilias in cases involving
family relationships, even in cases in which
those decisions did not seem compassionate or
wise (McGuire v. McGuire, 1953). Thus, determination of patient capacity was far less relevant
with regard to medical decision making than it
is today. Physicians handled decisions for most
patients, and to the extent that the physician
consulted ‘‘family,’’ the paterfamilias was that
family.
During the last 3 decades of the 20th
century, social norms and legal rules have
recognized the right of an autonomous patient
to make his or her own medical decisions.
As noted, this trend harmonized with shifts
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in society’s understanding of families as
collections of autonomous individuals rather
than as communities with prescribed roles and
statuses that transcended the significance of
individuals’ choices, at least with regard to adults
in families.
Society and the law remain conflicted
about the shape of childhood and the rights
that should be accorded at different stages
of childhood (Segadelli, 2010). In general,
uncertainties about the meaning of childhood
and the scope of the parent-child relationship
are legion and can complicate medical decision
making for and about children. Although the
law has granted children some of the rights
of autonomous individuality in the past few
decades (In re Gault, 1967; Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,
1969), U.S. society continues to view children
as vulnerable and dependent (Bellotti v. Baird,
1979). Contradictions abound, and legal rules
about medical decision making for and by
children vary widely from state to state. In
particular, society has been ambivalent about
the extent to which its commitment to equal
rights for everyone determines the rights we
accord to children. In fact, contemporary society
has been far more reticent about leveling
the status difference between children and
adults. Children, explained law professor Steven
Shiffrin (1980), are the Achilles’ heel of
liberalism.
Thus, by the end of the 20th century, society
and the law encouraged capable patients to rely
on family members—and on clinicians—only
insofar as they chose to do so. Rather, the law
generally required clinicians to share medical
decision-making tasks with the patient involved.
To that extent, patients gained a central role in
directing the course of their own health care. This
is a stunning recognition of individual autonomy
as a value in the world of health care.
However, the presumption that patients
have the right to choose whether to consent
to suggested treatments or to refuse those
treatments assumes a capable patient. Patients
without capacity are not deemed autonomous.
Such patients are treated more or less as
the law and the health-care system treat very
young children. (More deference is often paid
to older children, depending on the issue
at stake and the child’s maturity.) In short,
for adult patients without advance directives
and without capacity, as for children, a need
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developed to determine by law what had
previously been determined by unselfconscious
assumptions about the parameters of family
relationships. Increasing success with keeping
terminal patients alive on life-sustaining care
augmented the urgency of defining surrogate
decision makers in hospital and nursing home
settings.
Cases involving incompetent patients in
need of medical decision making occasioned
considerable dispute in the last decades of the
20th century. Old patterns that relied on the
authority of the paterfamilias to make decisions
for other family members had largely been
abandoned and replaced with patterns presuming
patient autonomy. This worked well enough for
competent patients but not for those without
capacity (who had not left advance directives).
State lawmakers responded variously. A few
states, including New York, entered a long
period in which certain medical decisions,
especially end-of-life decisions, for patients
without capacity could not be implemented.
For instance, in In re Storar (1981), New
York’s highest court mandated that treatment
be continued for a dying man who had been
severely retarded since birth. John Storar’s
mother had asked that treatments be stopped,
but the court concluded that in the absence of
evidence of John’s own wishes, it could not
order an end to care. About 20 years later, New
York’s legislature followed the vast majority
of states in providing for surrogate decision
making for patients without capacity and without
an advance directive or some equivalent. The
legislation (considered in more detail later in this
article) rested on the widespread presumption
that incompetent patients would have wanted
medical decisions made by particular relatives
and others (listed in the law in order of priority).
New York’s statute, the Family Health Care
Decisions Act (FHCDA) of 2010, a latecomer
to this bailiwick of lawmaking, is illustrative. It
provides a prioritized list of surrogate decision
makers for patients deemed to lack capacity.
Under the law, health-care surrogates for adult
patients without capacity (and without advance
directives) are identified in this order: a spouse
or domestic partner; a child who is at least
18; a parent; a sibling who is at least 18;
and, finally, a close friend (FHCDA 2010,
§ 2994-d). The law defines both ‘‘domestic
partner’’ and ‘‘close friend’’ broadly (FHCDA
2010, § 2994-a). The latter term is defined
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to include relatives not classed among those
expressly enumerated (i.e., relatives other than a
spouse, child, parent, sibling) (FHCDA 2010, §
2994-a(4)). The inclusion of domestic partner
at the same level of priority as spouse is
of enormous moment, and again suggests the
breadth of changes in traditional visions of
family and their implementation in healthcare settings. The Code of Ethics of the
American Medical Association (2001) explains,
‘‘Physicians should recognize the proxy or
surrogate as an extension of the patient, entitled
to the same respect as the competent patient’’
(n.p.). In cases in which adult patients have
nominated health-care proxies while competent,
the surrogate’s identity reflects the patient’s preincompetence wishes. In other cases, surrogates
are usually chosen by reference to state laws
(e.g., New York, FHCDA) that prioritize family
members in a list of possible surrogates.
The need to establish and implement a process
for choosing surrogate decision makers and
attending to their decisions has led to the
institutionalization in hospitals and other healthcare facilities of mechanisms for resolving
disputes among patients, patients’ relatives, legal
surrogates, and clinicians. The proliferation of
ethics committees in hospitals reflects a need
to resolve conflicts about medical decisions for
incompetent patients among family members or
between family members and clinicians (Council
on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, 2001). A half
century ago, the privileged familial status of
the paterfamilias would have precluded public
acknowledgment of disputes about medical
decision making among a patient’s family
members. That is no longer the case. Yet it is
not possible to rely equally on the presumption
that autonomous, individual patients are alone
responsible for medical decision making. Thus,
lawmakers and professional groups have had
to contemplate the contours of family, and
they have had to devise institutional responses
to intrafamilial disputes that would once have
been resolved, for better or for worse, by the
inherent authority that traditional understandings
of family bestowed upon particular family
members vis-à-vis others in the family group
and that society bestowed upon clinicians, and
in particular, upon physicians.
Alongside the new rules about medical
decision making constructed during the past
few decades, some concern has developed about
when, if at all, autonomy should be limited
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in the name of a patient’s best interests. This
has resulted in a countermovement of sorts
(favoring beneficence over autonomy, at least
some of the time). It is not likely to eviscerate
the central principles of the informed-consent
doctrine. But it does call for more nuanced
attention to patients’ welfare, sometimes at the
expense of their autonomy (Levy, 2012).
In summary, the transformation of patientphysician relationships mostly paralleled the
transformation among family members beginning in the second part of the 20th century. Yet a
more recent concern with limiting patient autonomy to safeguard a patient’s welfare suggests
an effort to mediate the demands of individualism with those of community. Perhaps a
similar effort will eventually reshape family relationships. In some part, concern about limiting
patient autonomy is reflected in concern about
the extent to which society and the law are ready
to grant autonomy to children older than 7 or
8 years of age.
Medicine, Reproduction, and the ‘‘New’’
Family
Legal responses to family disputes occasioned
by reproductive technology increasingly privilege individualism and choice over traditional
family values. Reproductive technology generally implicates family relationships, and farreaching questions about the shape of family and
about the determinants of the parent-child relationship, in particular, have followed advances
in reproductive technology and their implementation. In recent decades, the use of reproductive
technology has led to a wide variety of disputes
about parentage. In the United States, legislators have responded slowly. Courts, however,
asked to entertain the discrepant claims of litigants seeking to resolve specific disputes about
parentage or potential parentage occasioned by
reproductive technology, have fashioned guidelines that have redefined the scope of parentage.
A set of late 20th- and early 21st-century California cases, for instance, suggests increasing
readiness to abandon understandings of family grounded in presumed biological ‘‘truths’’
in favor of parental intention and choice (Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 1998; Johnson v. Calvert,
1993; K.M. v. E.G., 2005). In the United
States, adoption law (first constructed in the
19th century) foreshadowed the notion that
the parent-child relationship need not rest on
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‘‘biology.’’ However, adoption was long
grounded on an agreement that the adopting
relationship was tantamount to the parent-child
relationship, based on the presumed biological
‘‘facts’’ of the reproductive process (e.g., birth
certificates have named adopting parents just as
they name biological parents) (Papke, 1999).
The increasing use of reproductive technology has rested on society’s readiness to abandon
traditional family patterns. And legal (especially
judicial) responses to disputes occasioned by
the use of reproductive technology have reinforced that social trend. By the last decades of
the 20th century, stunning new developments
in reproductive technology offered infertility
patients unprecedented reproductive options.
Each new reproductive option stimulated new
questions about how best to determine legal
parentage. Although the process of answering
these questions has been uneven, social and judicial responses have increasingly diluted concern
with identifying presumptive biological truths
with concern for parental intention and choice.
This history can be dated to the middle of
19th century, before most people could have
imagined in vitro fertilization or gestational
surrogacy. At that time, an American physician
named J. Marion Sims began to offer assisted
insemination to patients anxious to conceive
children. At least one of these inseminations
resulted in a successful pregnancy (Shalev,
1989; Swanson, 2012). The practice gained
wider use, although few pregnancies resulted
during the following few decades. Nevertheless,
reports about the use of donor sperm in the first
decades of the 20th century led to a social outcry
that deplored assisted (then called ‘‘artificial’’)
insemination as sinful and adulterous (Shalev,
1989). Still, by the middle of the 20th century,
the procedure was securely medicalized, and
soon this form of medicalized reproduction
was legalized. States throughout the United
States recognized its legitimacy, at least in
the case of married people. State legislatures
widely provided that children conceived through
assisted insemination using donor sperm became
the ‘‘natural’’ children of the husband as a legal
matter, assuming that the husband had consented
to the insemination (Shalev, 1989).
The novel presumption that the law had
the authority to determine ‘‘natural’’ parentage
even in cases in which the claim of ‘‘natural’’
parentage conflicted with long-standing and
unquestioned assumptions about family was
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remarkable. Even more, it presaged a pattern
that flowered during the last decades of the
20th century. Increasingly, the law allowed
social preferences, rather than old-fashioned
assumptions about ‘‘blood’’ or ‘‘genes,’’ to
define families, at least with regard to families
occasioned by reproductive technology.
Soon, developments in reproductive technology led to more and more innovative options for
reproduction and new forms of family. Louise
Brown, born in Oldham, England, in 1978, was
the first child conceived in vitro. Within a couple
of decades after this birth, zygotes conceived in
vitro were being cryopreserved for future use; a
child, conceived from the ovum of one woman,
could be gestated by a different woman; and
it became possible to effect posthumous conception, or children conceived after the deaths
of their biological parents. Posthumous births,
the birth of a man’s children after his death,
were as old as time. Posthumous conception was
entirely new.
Each of these possibilities led to confusion
and to disagreements among progenitors, clinicians, tissue banks, and/or third parties (e.g.,
‘‘surrogate mothers’’) involved in the reproductive process. And each required courts to
reinterpret traditional understandings of family
and of the parent–child relationship. The result
has been a vision of family as firmly linked with
notions of choice as with notions of biological
‘‘fact.’’
Although court decisions in the 1980s
involving cases of assisted reproduction, such as
those of the New Jersey courts in Matter of Baby
M. (1987/1988), mostly reinforced traditional
understandings of family, that approach did not
predominate for long. By the first decade of
the 21st century, courts in several states had
recognized families that reflected increasingly
novel reproductive facts. In many of these cases,
courts looked to relationships rather than to
biology in determining legal (sometimes even
referred to by courts as ‘‘natural’’) parentage.
Matter of Baby M. (1987/1988), decided in
New Jersey, received widespread publicity and,
in many ways, was the first important state-court
decision responsive to the challenges of reproductive technology. Interestingly, however, the
story at the center of the case involved no technology. But the case was a harbinger of those that
did because it posed the central question at stake
in disputes occasioned by reproductive technology: What role would biology play in defining
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families in a universe that was ready to challenge
traditional assumptions about the significance of
biology in identifying family relationships?
Matter of Baby M. (1987/1988) involved a
married couple, William and Elizabeth Stern.
They wanted children but were unwilling to
risk Elizabeth’s becoming pregnant (for medical
reasons). The couple hired a surrogate, Mary
Beth Whitehead, who agreed to gestate a baby
conceived through assisted insemination using
Stern’s sperm and, at the baby’s birth, to yield
maternal rights to the Sterns. In fact, William
Stern, Mary Beth Whitehead, and Whitehead’s
husband, Richard, signed the contract at issue
in the legal case. Richard Whitehead signed the
contract so as to deny any claims to paternity
to a child that might be born as a result of the
insemination of his wife with Stern’s sperm.
And Elizabeth Stern (an ‘‘intending,’’ but not a
biological, mother) did not sign the contract for
fear that doing so might violate laws prohibiting
the purchase or sale of a child. After the birth
of the baby—a girl, born in March 1986—Mary
Beth Whitehead, unable to hand the child over
to the Sterns, fled to Florida with the child. The
Sterns commenced litigation, seeking return of
the child and a declaration of their parentage.
The trial court sided with the Sterns on
almost all fronts. In effect, it upheld the contract
(although the judge framed his decision as
one serving the ‘‘best interests’’ of the child
rather than the legal rights of the Sterns).
The court terminated Whitehead’s parental
rights, granted custody to William Stern, and
arranged for a speedy adoption of the child
by Elizabeth Stern. On appeal, New Jersey’s
highest court overturned the ruling of the trial
court judge. It identified William Stern and
Mary Beth Whitehead as the baby’s parents.
The court conceptualized the case as one
might conceptualize any custody dispute, as, for
instance, between divorcing parents. The court
granted custody to William Stern and visitation
rights to Whitehead.
In the decades since Matter of Baby M.
(1987/1988), courts have determined the implications for parenthood of genetics, gestation,
and reproductive intention. No settled pattern
of legal responses in the United States as a
whole has emerged. However, a number of states
have provided for determinations of parenthood
by balancing assessments of the role of biology and intention in particular cases. In one of
the first cases of this sort decided by a state’s

69
highest court, the Supreme Court of California
concluded that maternity can be grounded on
evidence of maternal intention plus some cognizable biological link to a child. That link could
be either genetic or gestational.
Johnson v. Calvert (1993) involved a dispute
between a ‘‘gestational surrogate’’ (the woman
who gestated and gave birth to the disputed
baby) and a couple, who contributed the sperm
and egg from which the baby was conceived in
vitro. The couple, Mark and Crispina Calvert,
had entered into a contract with Anna Johnson,
the surrogate. For a fee, Anna agreed to gestate
and give birth to a child, conceived from the
Calvert’s gametes, and, at the baby’s birth, to
give the child to the Calverts (the ‘‘intending’’
parents). Thus, the case resembled Matter of
Baby M. (1987/1988) except that the intending
parents were both related to the child genetically,
and the surrogate was not.
Before the birth of the baby, a boy, the
parties had gone to court in a dispute about
the child’s legal parentage. Three California
courts entertained the case. All held for the
Calverts. The three decisions, viewed as a set,
are particularly fascinating in that the trial court
held for the Calverts because they were linked to
the child through genetics; the state intermediate
appellate court held for the Calverts, on the
basis of its interpretation of state statutory law.
And the Supreme Court of California organized
the pieces within a novel legal frame and
declared that in cases involving two women,
each presenting cognizable claims to biological
maternity, the state would identify the intentional
mother (the woman who, from the start, intended
to raise the child) as the legal mother. In
some cases that woman would presumably be
the gestational mother, and in others (such as
Johnson), she would be the genetic mother. This
decision, now almost 2 decades old, established
an innovative approach to the identification of
the mother–child relationship. It provided for
the recognition of ‘‘natural’’ maternity even
though it elided traditional assumptions about
what makes a woman a mother.
Then, a little more than a decade later, the
same court seemed to upend its assertion in
Johnson that a child can have ‘‘only one natural
mother’’ (Johnson v. Calvert, 1993, p. 781).
In one of three companion cases decided in
2005, California’s supreme court named two
women (who had been same-gender partners)
as the mothers of twins conceived from the
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eggs of one of the women and gestated by
the other. Even more, it would seem that had
the court looked to the Johnson intent test, it
should have rejected the genetic mother’s legal
maternity. On an ovum donation form prepared
by the fertility clinic where the children involved
were conceived, the woman who donated the
eggs so that her partner could become pregnant
expressly denied any intention to become a
mother to any children who might be conceived
from her eggs (K.M. v. E.G., 2005). The court
in K.M. and its companion cases (Elisha B.
v. Superior Court, 2005; Kristine H. v. Lisa
R., 2005) stressed the importance of adults’
parenting choices rather than their intentions
pre-conception in determining legal and natural
maternity. Most important, for understandings of
family, this trilogy of cases (of which K.M. was
one) stands for the proposition that ‘‘natural’’
maternity need not entail biological maternity.
This proposition is, and for some time will
likely remain, a point of contention among states
in the United States and among nations. For
instance, in 2006 the British House of Lords
expressly privileged biology over maternal
behavior in a custody dispute occasioned by
the breakdown of a relationship between two
women (In re G (Children), 2006). The children
involved had been conceived through assisted
insemination. The court overturned the decisions
of two lower courts, both of which granted
primary custody to the nonbiological mother
on the grounds that the biological mother had
attempted to preclude her onetime partner from
visiting the children. The House of Lords began
by explaining: ‘‘In reaching its decision the
court should always have in mind that in the
ordinary way the rearing of a child by his or her
biological parent can be expected to be in the
child’s best interests, both in the short term and
also, and importantly, in the longer term. I decry
any tendency to diminish the significance of this
factor’’ (In re G (Children), 2006, p. 1).
Thus, with respect to families created through
reliance on assisted reproduction, some courts
continue to privilege biology over intention and
behavior. But others, such as the California court
in K.M. v. E.G. and its companion cases, look at
parental choices and conduct as the hallmarks of
legal parentage.
In summary, families that valued individuality and equality more than community and
hierarchy provided the cultural grounding for
the implementation of reproductive technology.
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Yet that implementation inevitably resulted in
disputes about legal parentage and the scope of
family. For the most part, responses to those
disputes further privileged families of ‘‘choice’’
over traditional families. For researchers and
social theorists, these disputes and responses to
them provide a fruitful context for assessing the
changing shape of family relationships.
Genetic Testing, ‘‘Familial’’ Conditions,
and Genomics
The notion of family discussed in the previous
section—that being elaborated by society and
the law in the context of families occasioned by
reproductive technology—stresses choice and
intention. In contrast, a focus on genetic information results in a different notion of family.
This understanding of family is framed by the
presumption of shared substance (‘‘blood’’ or
genes). For families faced with disease and
disability associated with genetic alterations,
for example, the biological components of
familial relationships can become particularly
compelling. They may even trump the modern concern with choice and the actuality of
relationships in families. What is the potential
significance of genomic information in reshaping understandings of family?
Both the genetic family and the traditional
family are based on a notion of inevitability
grounded in biology. Yet even as the genetic
family (as a theoretical construct) differs from
the family of choice, it differs quite as certainly
from the traditional family. But the genetic
family abandons the social components of family
to become essentially an ahistorical construct.
As a theoretical matter, the construction
of a ‘‘genetic family’’—a family identified
primarily through reference to information about
shared genetics—raises perplexing questions.
However, the notion of a genetic family is not
only theoretical. The advent of genetic testing
and of genomics (which focuses on many genes
and on interrelations among them) has startling
implications for the meaning of family. As a
practical matter, those implications have had
consequences in only a few situations, most of
which involve familial illnesses and conditions.
The ability of science to identify genetic
alterations associated with what were once
called familial conditions has resulted in the
medicalization of families. Should one family
member test positive for a deleterious genetic
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alteration, that test may transform individuals or
groups of people who are not sick into patients
(Elliott, 2003). In short, should one or a few
members of a family group show symptoms of
a genetic disease or test positive for a genetic
alternation associated with a particular disease
or condition, the implications extend beyond
that person to others in his or her family. For
many people who are told that they have tested
positive for a deleterious genetic alteration,
significant questions may develop about whom
to tell and what to relate. In many states, the
law requires physicians to tell a patient with
a genetic condition or a genetic alteration that
increases the risk of developing such a condition
that others in their kin group are also at risk and
should be informed of that risk.
In 1995, the Florida Supreme Court entertained a case that raised important questions
about a physician’s obligation to communicate
information about a genetic condition. The court
held that a physician’s obligation to provide
information did not include an obligation to communicate directly with a patient’s relatives (Pate
v. Threlkel, 1995). Heidi Pate initiated the case
by suing her mother’s physician, Dr. Threlkel.
The physician had treated Heidi’s mother for
medullary thyroid carcinoma. Heidi, who had
subsequently been diagnosed with an advanced
form of the same condition, argued that had
Threlkel warned her about the risk to her (in
light of her mother’s diagnosis and the genetic
character of the condition), she would have been
diagnosed and obtained care early enough to
achieve a cure. More specifically, Heidi argued
that her mother’s physician had a duty to warn
his patient’s daughter that she was at risk for
developing the cancer with which his patient
had been diagnosed. In effect, Heidi argued
that Threlkel’s obligation to provide information extended beyond his patient to that patient’s
children (and, presumably, to other close
relatives).
Heidi’s claim suggest that a doctor’s patient
group, at least for purposes of providing
information about a genetic condition, extends
beyond the individual patient to family members.
It would, thus, seem to conflate the patient
and his or her genetic relatives, at least in the
specific context of medical care. The Florida
Supreme Court, acknowledging a possible duty
to warn, rejected the suggestion that the doctor
was required to warn his patient’s relatives. The
court explained:
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If there is a duty to warn, to whom must the
physician convey the warning? Our holding should
not be read to require the physician to warn the
patient’s children of the disease. In most instances
the physician is prohibited from disclosing the
patient’s medical condition to others except with
the patient’s permission. See § 255.241(2), Fla.
Stat. (1989). Moreover, the patient ordinarily can
be expected to pass on the warning. To require the
physician to seek out and warn various members
of the patient’s family would often be difficult or
impractical and would place too heavy a burden
upon the physician. Thus, we emphasize that in
any circumstances in which the physician has a
duty to warn of a genetically transferable disease,
that duty will be satisfied by warning the patient.
(Pate v. Threlkel, 1995, p. 282)

In a troubling twist on this conclusion, a
New Jersey court—in a case not unlike Pate v.
Threlkel—imposed on a physician precisely the
sort of obligation that Heidi Pate had claimed,
unsuccessfully, that Dr. Threlkel owed to her.
Donna Safer initiated the case in question by
suing Dr. Pack’s estate, the deceased physician
who had treated her father, Robert Batkin, during
his final illness. Almost 3 decades after Batkin
died of a hereditary form of colon cancer,
Safer was diagnosed with the same condition
(Safer v. Pack, 1996). The case preceded
the identification of any genetic alterations
associated with colon cancer. However, the court
presumed that physicians were, or should have
been, aware of the hereditary character of the
condition. Donna Safer, like Heidi Pate, argued
that a physician was obliged to warn a patient’s
child about a hereditary condition from which
the patient suffered and for which the child was
thus at risk. Donna was 10 years old when her
father died. Thus, presumably the obligation at
issue involved informing Donna’s mother of the
risk. The mother, Ida Batkin, testified that she
had not been informed about a risk to her children
or even about her husband’s cancer diagnosis.
She explained that Dr. Pack had described her
husband’s condition to her as a ‘‘blockage’’
or ‘‘infection,’’ and that when asked about the
possibility of a risk to her children, Dr. Pack
told her ‘‘not to worry’’ (Safer v. Pack, 1996, p.
1190). Judge Keston, writing for a New Jersey
appellate court, recognized the duty that Donna
Safer had delineated. He explained that a ‘‘duty
to warn of avertable risk from genetic causes,
by definition a matter of familial concern, is
sufficiently narrow to serve the interests of
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justice’’ (Safer v. Pack, 1996, p. 1192). The
court further asserted that a physician’s duty
to warn a patient’s family members about the
genetic component of a patient’s condition might
be ‘‘owed not only to the patient himself but
that it also ‘extend[s] beyond the interests of a
patient to members of the immediate family of
the patient who may be adversely affected by a
breach of that duty’’’ (Safer v. Pack, 1996, p.
1992, quoting Schroeder v. Perkel, 1981, p. 65).
The judicial decision in Safer was soon
limited by the state’s legislature, which provided
that clinicians can reveal genetic information
about a patient to that patient’s relatives only
if the patient has consented or has died
(Genetic Privacy Act, 1996). However, the
case carries far-reaching implications for social
constructions of family. In particular, it poses
the image of family as an undifferentiated whole
(from the perspective of genetic information).
As a practical matter, this construction of
family suggests that a physician’s patient
may be a familial group rather than an
individual. That suggestion, in turn, carries
serious implications for understandings of
confidentiality and privacy. Robert Wachbroit
(1993) noted that asking, ‘‘Who is the patient?’’
may be more complicated than one generally
assumes:
[I]f the idea of the patient were to include [a close
genetic relative], then the health professional’s
informing the [relative] of . . . genetic information
[about the patient] would not constitute a breach
of confidentiality. Indeed, one might argue that
the health professional is not simply permitted to
inform the [relative], but is actually required to
do so, given the duty to disclose relevant medical
information to the patient. (pp. 1401–1403)

In effect, Wachbroit’s suggestion (much like
Donna Safer’s in her case against Dr. Pack)
conflates the individual patient with his or her
larger genetic family. Each individual in the
group can be viewed as substitutable for each
other because, from the perspective of DNA,
they are fungible, or at least potentially so.
In practice, clinicians will surely distinguish
between individual patients and familial groups.
However, the notion of the patient as a group of
people (joined by putative genetic similarities)
could eventually transform rules about privacy
and confidentiality that now focus on the
individual person, not his or her familial group.
That shift, even if initiated only with reference to

genetic information, could affect legal responses
to privacy and could eventually affect modes of
thinking about families more generally.
CONCLUSION: USING THEORY IN PRACTICE
In the late 20th and early 21st centuries,
assumptions about family and assumptions
about relationships in the world of health care
have shifted in parallel fashion. In each social
domain, choice and autonomous individuality
have largely replaced fixed roles and communal
hierarchy. Changing assumptions about family
relationships and changing assumptions about
relationships in the world of health care
have facilitated, reinforced, and sometimes
challenged one another. This review has
examined three examples of these processes.
The following concrete examples are intended
to explore the implications for practice. In particular, these examples suggest how awareness of
and attention to assumptions about family relationships and about relationships in the world
of health care can be of use to practitioners in
resolving conflicts about health care. The two
examples both involve patients asking for care
that is at odds with clinicians’ recommendations
and with family members’ wishes. In both illustrations, the goals of individualism (which, as
noted earlier, privilege autonomy) conflict with
the goals of community (which, as noted earlier,
privilege paternalism and loyalty).
In the first illustration, an 82-year-old patient
named Gertrude has rejected her physicians’
strong recommendation that her gangrenous leg
be amputated. Gertrude’s doctors have concluded that without the recommended surgery,
her chance of survival is very low. Gertrude’s
husband, Jack, assumed that Gertrude would follow her doctors’ recommendations. He is now
distraught to find that that is not the case. In
fact, he has become quite angry at Gertrude.
During most of Gertrude and Jack’s 60 years
of marriage, Jack made the family’s important
decisions.
The task of mediating the conflicts underlying
this case may require hours of conversation
and mediation (Dubler, 2011). Among other
things, it would be important to explore the
parameters of Jack’s anger. A professional (e.g.,
a social worker, a psychologist, a nurse, a
hospital ethics committee) involved in this case
should be able to identify the parties’ conflicting
visions of the role that autonomy and paternalism
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(viewed here as beneficence) play in shaping
medical decision making for and/or by Gertrude.
It would be useful to help the parties understand
that their differences flow, at least in part, from
their divergent views about the extent to which
Gertrude’s decision making should be shaped
(if at all) by Jack’s assumption that he is
responsible for Gertrude and by the clinicians’
discomfort at sacrificing beneficent care in the
name of patient autonomy. It will be easier
for all those involved to focus on the medical
decision that must be made once they see that
the intensity of disagreement among them flows
as much from their divergent assumptions about
who should decide as about what should be
decided.
The second illustration falls under a subset
of cases involving patients who refuse care
recommended by their clinicians. In these cases,
the patients involved seem to enjoy significant
capacity, yet a capacity determination has been
requested largely because the patient’s medical
decision does not seem rational to the clinicians.
(It should not be assumed that clinicians who call
for capacity determinations in such cases are
simply attempting to exercise control. Rather,
most would seem to fear that the patient will fare
badly without the treatment at issue and either
genuinely question the patient’s capacity or see a
capacity determination as the only way to protect
a patient from a ‘‘bad’’ decision.) Imagine a
patient, Bill, who refuses chemotherapy even
though his physicians tell him that he has a
70% to 80% chance of long-term remission
if he undergoes chemotherapy. Bill, age 23,
saw his cousin (who was also a dear friend)
die horribly of cancer, and he is unwilling
to undergo the travails of treatment and then
perhaps die anyway within a few years. Bill’s
siblings—a younger brother, Bob, and two older
sisters, Jane and Ann—with whom he is very
close, are now at odds with one another about
whether to try to convince Bill to agree to
chemotherapy. They have always gotten along
fairly well, but Jane has proclaimed that she’ll
never talk with Bob again because she wants to
convince Bill to try the treatment being offered,
and Bob is adamant that Bill has a right to
make his own decision without his siblings’
interference.
Bill’s case poses patient autonomy against
clinician beneficence. Under the law, Bill, if
deemed capable, has a right to refuse care.
Yet at least two parameters of the case
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demand careful consideration. The first involves
assessments of Bill’s capacity. The second
involves the concerns of Bill’s siblings and
his clinicians, who want to provide what they
consider good care. The conflict about Bill’s
care could be resolved by a determination
(presumably well-intentioned) that Bill lacks
capacity. This would be terribly hard on Bill.
Alternatively, the conflict could be resolved
by deeming Bill capable and autonomous
and requiring his clinicians to cede authority
without more discussion. This could leave the
clinicians frustrated and uncomfortable. And
neither of these approaches is likely to ease
the anxieties of, and disagreements among,
Bill’s siblings. A better course, for everyone,
would allow the parties (helped by a social
worker, a hospital ethics committee, or some
other professional) to explore the divergent
assumptions about autonomy and beneficence
that underlie the conflict. Then, most felicitously,
Bill, if deprived of the power of autonomy,
might at least understand the beneficent motives
of his clinicians. And the clinicians, if unable
to treat Bill as they would like, might, again
most felicitously, understand Bill’s assumptions
and motives and thus respond to Bill’s medical
decision more sanguinely than they might
otherwise respond. Bill’s siblings would almost
certainly benefit as well from this sort of
approach to the conflict between Bill and his
clinicians.
Understanding conflicting assumptions about
autonomy and community (beneficence, in these
cases) is not likely to obliterate underlying
differences in approach. But identifying and
revealing such underlying assumptions can help
each party involved in cases such as Gertrude’s
and Bill’s to more fully appreciate the others’
viewpoints and perhaps even encourage those
involved to reach a compromise that will give
solace to everyone (e.g., waiting a few days,
if that is possible, before making a definitive
decision). In short, for family researchers and
theorists, parallel (often synergistic) changes
in the worlds of family and health care offer
a wealth of data for exploring the social
and cultural implications of shifting visions of
personhood and of relationships. And for the
clinician and other practitioners, changes in each
domain offer a field of comparison, a laboratory
of sorts, from which to contemplate the benefits
and risks of changes in the other domain. This
laboratory provides a locus for gaining insights
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that may prove of great use in helping resolve
disputes that implicate both family relationships
and relationships among clinicians, patients, and
patients’ family members.
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